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Abstract
Improvements in Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs) have greatly reduced the difficulty of producing
new, photo-realistic images with unique semantic meaning.
With this rise in ability to generate fake images comes de-
mand to detect them. While numerous methods have been
developed for this task, the majority of them remain vul-
nerable to adversarial attacks. In this paper, develop two
novel adversarial attacks on co-occurrence based GAN de-
tectors. These are the first attacks to be presented against
such a detector. We show that our method can reduce ac-
curacy from over 98% to less than 4%, with no knowledge
of the deep learning model or weights. Furthermore, accu-
racy can be reduced to 0% with full knowledge of the deep
learning model details.
1. Introduction
Since the advent of Generative Adversarial Networks
(GANs) in 2014 [8], there has been a dramatic increase
in the capabilities of GAN networks. They are now able
to modify facial attributes in photo-realistic 1 megapixel
images [11], perform image-to-image translation [32], and
create new images given only a segmentation map [21].
With the vast increase in capability of GANs, there have
been a number of detectors developed to distinguish GAN
from authentic images [19, 27, 30, 1, 18]. These detectors
generally perform well, reporting over 98% test set accu-
racy. However, the question then arises as to what adversar-
ial methods can be used to fool these detectors.
We focus primarily on attacking the co-occurrence fea-
ture based GAN detector proposed by Nataraj et al. [19].
Our paper makes the following contributions:
1. Describes the first targeted attacks against co-
occurrence based GAN detectors known to the authors.
2. Generalizes the discrete co-occurrence matrices used
for GAN detection to a differentiable function, and
Figure 1. Outline of this paper’s primary contribution, the gray-
box co-occurrence attack. The method can impart a co-occurrence
matrix taken from a benign image into a GAN image, fooling a
GAN detector. Shown in each dashed box are the images and as-
sociated co-occurrence matrices.
shows that gradient descent based attacks on a co-
occurrence based detector with known model weights
can be used to bring detector accuracy down to 0%.
3. Creates a new attack gray-box against co-occurrence
based detectors, which assumes no knowledge of the
deep learning weights or architecture. Tests with this
method show that it can drop accuracy on GAN images
from 98% to less than 4%.
4. Demonstrate that without adversarial training against
our method, it can decrease accuracy of other GAN
detection methods by approximately 18%.
2. Related Works
2.1. Co-Occurrence Matrices in Steganography
Co-occurrence matrices have a long history in image
forensics, as features for detecting steganography, along
with works intended to counter such detectors [25, 24].
Though steganography presents a unique challenge in that
an adversarial image still must contain the embedded mes-
sage, changes are often to a small number of pixels, and to a
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small degree, making restoring the statistics an easier task.
In contrast, GAN manipulations are more pronounced, sig-
nificantly changing the image’s pixels and semantics.
2.2. GAN Detection Methods
Many methods of GAN detection have been proposed,
though the one of primary interest will be that used in
Nataraj et al. They propose using co-occurrence matrices
as a feature, which will be passed to a binary deep learning
classifier. Another variation of the co-occurrence detector
was recently posted on arXiv, which includes cross-channel
co-occurrence pairs in the feature [1]. Abridged results gen-
eralizing our attack to this method are in section 6.5.2.
Several methods were proposed in an older work from
F. Marra et al. [18]. These included constraining the in-
put layer of a neural network classifier to a high-pass fil-
ter, computing co-occurrence matrices on high-pass filtered
images, and reusing the original GAN discriminator. A
more recent method proposed that simply training a ResNet
model directly on a real vs GAN dataset was effective on
most modern GANs [27].
Another work from Zhang et al. used the Discrete
Fourier Transform (DFT) of each image channel as a fea-
ture to pass to a ResNet model [30]. This method took ad-
vantage of the upsampling artifacts created by most GANs.
2.3. Adversarial Methods Against GAN Detectors
In creating adversarial methods against GAN detectors,
there is a spectrum of assumed knowledge levels about the
system. At one extreme, everything about the detection sys-
tem is known, including model weights. This scenario, re-
ferred to as white-box attack, has been investigated heavily
in general computer vision tasks [9, 14, 16, 3, 26, 7, 23, 28].
Most of these attacks use some variation of gradient descent
through the network to perturb an input, such that the net-
work gives the incorrect label. While such attacks require
that the entire model be known and differentiable, they can
generally achieve high degradation in accuracy for a small
change in input. Prior to our work, direct and DFT based
methods fit this differentiability criteria, but co-occurrence
detectors did not.
At the other extreme are black-box methods, which at-
tempt to degrade detector performance with no knowledge
of the detection method being used. Though generally be-
nign in practice, JPEG compression, blurring, and down-
sampling have all be investigated for their effects on detec-
tor performance. An interesting alternative in this category
was proposed by Neves et al [20]. They show that their
method can decrease detection accuracy from greater than
99% to 82-95% on an Xception based detector, assuming
no adversarial retraining. For the co-occurrence based de-
tector, accuracy decreased by 14.7%.
Between these two cases are gray-box attacks. One of
Figure 2. High-level diagram of the detection architectures. Sec-
tions 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 describe the different feature extraction
methods investigated. Section 6.2 describes the different CNN ar-
chitectures tested.
these gray-box methods was proposed in [30]. It utilized
the fact that most GANs have a similar architecture for up-
sampling. Their AutoGAN architecture would take in a real
image, and attempt to reproduce this image at the output.
However, the model would be constrained to use the same
upsampling layers as were used in GANs, and would ide-
ally introduce the same artifacts. The authors proposed this
as an efficient way to generate more GAN-like images for
detector training.
While the previous gray-box method can impart GAN
artifacts on a real image, it cannot do the reverse. For most
adversarial scenarios, the attacker would be interested in
methods to make a GAN image appear real. The majority
of this paper will focus on this direction, with the reverse
case investigated in section 6.5.1.
3. Detection Methods
In addition to the co-occurrence features, we also investi-
gate the co-occurrence and direct methods. Figure 2 shows
an abstract outline of these models. This section describes
the 3 methods we investigate for the feature extraction step.
3.1. Co-Occurrence
Unless stated otherwise, we will use the horizontal co-
occurrence matrix defined by Nataraj et al. For each chan-
nel in the RGB input image, represented by the arrayX , we
produce a 2D histogram of horizontal pixel pairs:
Ci,j =
∑
k,l
δ(Xk,l − i) · δ(Xk,l+1 − j) (1)
Where δ(·) is the Kronecker delta function:
δ(k) =
{
1, if k = 0
0, otherwise
, k ∈ Z (2)
Each co-occurrence matrix is then scaled into the range
[0, 1], re-stacked in the channel dimension, and passed to a
deep learning classifier.
3.2. DFT
As proposed by Zhang et al., we will use the DFT of the
image as an input to a deep learning classifier. The process-
ing steps for the DFT based method are as follows:
1. Get the centered, unitary DFT of the input image
2
2. Take the magnitude of the DFT
3. Apply the function f(x) = log
(
x+ 10−6
)
4. Shift and scale into the range [-1,1]
All steps are consistent with those used in X. Zhang et
al., except for the inclusion of a small constant in step 3,
to prevent a log(0) case. They use a ResNet34 architecture
pretrained with ImageNet weights for detection.
3.3. Direct
This method will pass the image directly to a deep learn-
ing classifier, with only affine scaling as a preprocessing
step. The following ImageNet means and standard are ap-
plied, as per the torchvision documentation [17]:
mean = 255 · [0.485, 0.456, 0.406], (3)
std = 255 · [0.229, 0.224, 0.225] (4)
For their direct method, Wang et al. used ResNet50 pre-
trained on ImageNet [27].
4. Co-Occurrence Gray-Box Attack
4.1. Attack Formulation
For our gray-box attack, we assume that it is known that
co-occurrence matrices are the only feature used for detec-
tion, but we have no knowledge about the deep learning
model used on these matrices. We also assume that the ad-
versary has an arbitrary set of real images at their disposal.
The goal of the adversary will be to modify each GAN im-
age by some small amount, such that the co-occurrence ma-
trix of the adversarial image is close to, if not exactly equal
to, the co-occurrence matrix of a real image.
The adversarial, real, and GAN images will be repre-
sented by XA, XR, and XG respectively. F (·) is the co-
occurrence function, Loss1(·, ·) and Loss2(·, ·) are the loss
functions to be defined later, and λ is a user-defined con-
stant. The adversarial image will be proposed as:
XA = argmin
X˜
Loss1(F (X˜), F (XR)) + λLoss2(X˜,XG)
(5)
4.2. Distinctions Between Co-Occurrence and His-
tograms
Given the formulation in 5, it is worth noting that the
Earth Mover’s Distance (EMD) solves a similar optimiza-
tion problem, and that there exist efficient approximations
[22]. For a pair of 2 dimensional histograms and for some
pre-defined cost function between bins, this would produce
a minimal cost transformation from one histogram to the
other. However, non-edge pixels will appear twice in the co-
occurrence histogram, once as the left pixel in the pair, and
again as the right. Therefore, entries in the co-occurrence
matrix cannot be individually manipulated to achieve this
optimal transport, without inadvertently changing values at
another location in the histogram.
To handle this entanglement between pairs, we use gra-
dient descent to find an approximate minima. However, this
will require the functions F , Loss1, and Loss2 to be differ-
entiable. The original definition of the co-occurrence func-
tion was over only integer inputs, posing a problem for the
differentiability requirement. The next few sections break
down the details of how F , Loss1, and Loss2 are selected.
4.3. Differentiable Extension of Co-Occurrence
Function
In creating a differentiable extension of the co-
occurrence matrix, we impose the following requirements:
1. For integer inputs, F (·) must be equivalent to the orig-
inal co-occurrence function.
2. The sum of the histogram bins should equal the num-
ber of input elements.
3. For all input elements, the contribution to each bin
must be non-increasing with respect to distance from
that bin.
4. It must be differentiable over R2[0,255].
Given the original co-occurrence formulation in equa-
tion 1, a simple extension would be to define a new one-
dimensional function f(·) which will interpolate the delta
function’s integer values:
Ci,j =
∑
k,l
f(Xk,l − i) · f(Xk,l+1 − j) (6)
Equation 6 consists only of additions, multiplications,
and f(·), making gradient calculation straightforward.
From this equation, the previous 4 requirements can be sim-
plified into these requirements on f(·):
1. f(x) = δ(x), x ∈ Z
2. f(x) = 1− f(x− 1), ∀x ∈ R[0,1]
3. dfdx ≤ 0 for x > 0, and dfdx ≥ 0 for x < 0
4. dfdx should be defined for all x ∈ R[−255,255]
The combination of constraints 1 and 3 will require that
f(x) = 0 for x /∈ (−1, 1). Therefore, each pixel pair will
contribute to at most 4 bins. This fact was taken advantage
of in implementation, as opposed to computing the entire
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summation in equation 6. Both the triangle and raise cosine
shown below were tested as interpolation functions:
tri(x) =
{
1− |x|, if |x| < 1
0, otherwise
(7)
raised cos(x) =
{
1+cos(pix)
2 , if |x| < 1
0, otherwise
(8)
For the triangle function, derivatives at x = −1, 0, 1 are
undefined, so the average of the left and right derivatives is
used. Raise cosine gave better results experimentally, and
will be used for the remained of the tests.
4.4. Co-Occurrence Loss Function
In this section, we provide intuitive reasoning and exper-
imental justification for our selection of Loss1. We provide
several motivating examples for the 1D and 2D histogram
cases. ”Source” will correspond to the GAN input, ”target”
to the real input, and ”solution” to the adversarial solution.
For all of these examples, we will assume λ = 0.
4.4.1 One-Dimensional Example
Consider the case with a source of [1, 2, 3], a target of
[2, 3, 4], and λ = 0. We would now like gradient descent to
push the source towards the target, making their histograms
equal. In this example, all derivatives should be negative.
Shown in Figure 3 are plots of loss for different loss
functions, varying one input at a time. Consider the loss
values as x1 is moved from 1 to 4. For L1, there is a con-
stant loss from x1 = 1 to 3. This is compared to L2, where
loss fluctuates in the same region. Given that the histogram
will have a constant L1 norm, and that L2 loss is less for
the vector [1/2,1/2] than [0,1], the L2 loss function tended
to get stuck between integer values. For this reason, we will
focus our attention on L1 loss.
Looking at the top left graph in Figure 3, the loss for
x1 decreases only after passing the threshold of 3. Using
point-wise loss, the vacancy at 4 can only pull values which
are within the (−1, 1) support region of f(·). To alleviate
this, we instead compute loss on a multiscale pyramid of the
histograms, with a downsampling factor of 2 in each step.
To combine the multi-scale losses, a simple weighted
sum is used. Weights are set equal to the downsampling fac-
tor at each level. This weight selection is motivated by the
fact that the cost of moving pixels between bins at each layer
in the pyramid scales with respect to the downsampling fac-
tor. Results using the image pyramid loss are shown in the
right column of Figure 3. When gradient descent is run on
the different loss functions for the 1D case, the results in
Figure 4 are produced.
Figure 3. Loss functions with respect to value in each index for 1D
loss functions, on source of [1,2,3] and target of [2,3,4]. Ideally,
we would like the gradients for each index, at initialization, to
be negative. This will push each value in the source towards the
target. L1 loss would often get stuck on the plataeus, L2 would get
stuck at the minima in-between integer values, and the L1 pyramid
converged more easily. See figure 4 for convergence results.
Figure 4. Plot of each value in the source vector with respect to
step number, when solving with a source of [1,2,3] and target of
[2,3,4]. Top left: without random noise, all points are stuck in
flat regions, no change in values. Top right: the addition of noise
allows for the algorithm using L1 norm to gradually drift towards
the target. Bottom row: Both with and without noise, the algorithm
converges over 14 times faster than the top right case.
4.4.2 Two-Dimensional Examples
A 2D example is shown in figure 5. Especially important
from this figure is the necessity of random noise. Often we
will need points initialized to the same value to arbitrarilly
split into two different outcomes, which cannot occur with
deterministic gradient descent.
This two-dimensional histogram test was repeated over
100 iterations, with both source and target vectors contain-
ing 8 elements uniformally sampled from Z2[0,7]. For the L1
pyramid with Gaussian noise, all 100 tests successfully con-
verged from the source to target. This is compared to only
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Figure 5. Example applying point-wise and pyramid loss to a 2D
histogram gradient descent problem. Horizontal and vertical axes
represent location of the 2D vectors. Top left: with L1 loss and no
noise, all gradients are 0. Top right: With noise, L1 finds a sub-
optimal minima, where not all target points are reached. Bottom
left: Without added noise, the pyramid loss almost converges to a
global minima. However, the two source points originating from
(1,1) need to split and fill different target points. With determinis-
tic gradient descent, this splitting will not occur. Bottom right: A
proper solution is found with pyramid loss and noise.
8 for L1 with Gaussian noise.
4.4.3 Extension to Co-Occurrence on Images
For an 8-bit image, a 9 layer pyramid is used, with down-
sampling factors from 1 (None) to 256. To implement the
blurring and downsampling steps in the co-occurrence im-
age pyramid, we rely upon the original interpolation func-
tion defined for the co-occurrence. By dividing the input
image by the downsampling factor before computing co-
occurrence, lower resolution co-occurrence matrices can be
produced. The full loss function is shown in equation 9.
loss =
8∑
n=0
2n
∥∥∥∥F (XA2n
)
− F
(
XR
2n
)∥∥∥∥
1
(9)
4.5. Image-Space Loss Function
In equation 5, only the Loss2 and λ terms are left to be
defined. For consistency with the co-occurrence loss, L1
distance is chosen for the image-space loss. The λ parame-
ter remains as a user selected parameter, and several values
were tested experimentally.
Figure 6. Example solution found by our algorithm, for the given
real and GAN images.
4.6. Implementation Details
Ideally, we would like to choose source-target pairs with
similar color values for optimization. For example, we
would not want to force a GAN image with a green grassy
background to have the same color distribution as a real im-
age of a blue ocean. To do this, we divide the data into
blocks of size approximately 900, and for each GAN im-
age, select the real image whose EMD over the 1D RGB
histograms is closest to that of the GAN image.
With the pairs selected, we can then run our gradient de-
scent algorithm. The solution is initialized with the source
image. We use a standard gradient descent, with a learning
rate of 0.01, and momentum of 0.9. This is done in 3 se-
quential epochs, with 200, 50, and 50 steps. For the first 2
epochs, Gaussian noise with standard deviation of 0.01 is
added to the image. No noise is added in the last epoch.
The solution is rounded after each epoch.
When run on an Nvidia 1080 Ti, the algorithm took ap-
proximately 30 seconds per 256x256 image. However, up
to 3 processes could be placed on a single GPU, so 6 adver-
sarial images could be produced every minute.
Quantitative results are shown in figure 8. For compar-
ison, average L1 loss between the co-occurrence matrices
of the source target pairs was 0.90, and L1 loss between
source and target images was 52.7. For this real data, it can-
not achieve a perfect match between the real and adversarial
co-occurrence matrices. Two examples are given in figures
6 and 7. The effect of this slight mismatch is investigated
experimentally.
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Figure 7. Another example solution found by our algorithm, and
corresponding red channel co-occurrence matrices. In the top-left
corner of the solution co-occurrence a square artifact can be seen.
Figure 8. Testing of the co-occurrence algorithm on our dataset
described in section 6.1 on 200 images for 3 different λ values.
Smaller λ values will force the co-occurrence matrix of the adver-
sarial image closer to that of the real image, at the cost of greater
perturbation.
5. Other Adversarial Attacks
5.1. Gray-Box DFT
This method follows a similar formulation to the co-
occurrence gray-box attack. A real image is obtained in
addition to the GAN image, and the detection feature of the
adversarial image is made to be similar to the real image,
while minimizing the distance from the original GAN im-
age. We rely upon the intuition that the defining features of
the GAN in the DFT domain are concentrated away from
the DC axes. To estimate this high-frequency noise signal,
we use the same filter as Kirchner in his work on resampling
[13], and has a centered DFT given in equation 10:
F(f) = 1
4
3 0 30 0 0
3 0 3
 (10)
To produce an adversarial image, we solve the following:
Architecture Dataset Total Count
CycleGAN [32] apple2orange [5] 3,000
horse2zebra [5] 3,000
summer2winter [32] 3,000
cityscapes [4] 3,000
cezanne [32] 3,000
monet [32] 3,000
ukiyoe [32] 3,000
vangogh [32] 3,000
ProGAN [10] CelebHQ [15] 24,000
SPADE [21] ADE20K [31] 12,000
COCO-Stuff [2] 12,000
StyleGAN [11] LSUN Bedroom [29] 8,000
LSUN Car [29] 8,000
LSUN Cat [29] 8,000
Total 96,000
Table 1. Combined number of real and fake samples from each
data subset. For all subsets, the number of real and fake examples
is equal. In all, there were 48k real and 48k GAN images used.
XA = argmin
X˜
∥∥∥f ∗ X˜ − f ∗XR∥∥∥2
2
+ λ2
∥∥∥X˜ −XG∥∥∥2
2
(11)
Application of the Fourier transform turns this problem
into one of weighted least squares, and can be solved as:
F(XA) = F(f)
2 · F(XR) + λ2F(XG)
F(f)2 + λ2 (12)
This is done between randomly selected real and GAN
images, for different λ values in section 6.
5.2. White-Box PGD
With the co-occurrence, DFT, and direct methods all be-
ing differentiable pytorch functions, we run the L∞ PGD
algorithm on all GAN images on each method [16]. This
is done using the advertorch library [6]. Default parameters
are used, with a maximum distortion of 1, maximum step
size of 2/40, and 40 total iterations, running on pixels in the
range [0, 255]. Pixels are rounded after completion of PGD.
6. Experiments
6.1. Datasets
Our dataset consists of 4 different GANs, drawing from
a variety of image datasets and tasks. Image counts are
given in table 1. The each group is divided into a 70/15/15
train/val/test split. These groups are then further split in
half; the first for training and testing of models, and the sec-
ond for generating adversarial samples. All images were
center-cropped to 256x256.
6.2. Neural Network Selection
Neural network selection was done experimentally, and
results are shown in table 2. All models were trained with
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Method Co-Occurrence DFT Direct
Initialization ImNet rand ImNet rand ImNet rand
ResNet18 0.979 0.974 0.904 0.888 0.980 0.829
ResNet50 0.979 0.977 0.864 0.900 0.976 0.866
ResNet101 0.424 0.569 0.503 0.500 0.519 0.503
ResNet152 0.500 0.668 0.495 0.500 0.500 0.499
ResNeXt50 0.978 0.975 0.882 0.907 0.986 0.853
Inception V3 0.944 0.500 0.948 0.708 0.990 0.949
MobileNet 0.978 0.974 0.949 0.919 0.996 0.989
Table 2. Overall accuracy of different networks on a balanced test
set of real and GAN. Each row represents using a different deep
learning architecture. Three detection methods are shown as the
first column headers. The second shows results with either Ima-
geNet weights or random initialization.
Real GAN GB CO λ = 0.0 PGD CO
ResNet18 0.979 0.984 0.030 0.000
MobileNet 0.976 0.981 0.039 0.083
Table 3. Test set accuracy of co-occurrence based detectors, with-
out adversarial retraining. Gray-box (GB) co-occurrence (CO)
samples are generated as described in section 4. PGD co-
occurrence examples are produced using ResNet18.
16 real and 16 GAN images per batch, for 16 epochs. An
Adam optimizer was used, with default parameters of 0.001
for the learning rate, and (0.9,0.999) for the betas [12]. The
final model weights for testing are selected from the epoch
number on which validation loss was the lowest.
The ImageNet pretrained networks did better than those
with random initializations in almost all cases. As the larger
networks did not provide noticeable improvements on this
dataset, we will use pretrained ResNet18 and pretrained
MobileNet for the remainder of tests. We chose ResNet18
to generate the PGD samples, given that ResNets were used
by both Zhang et al. and Wang et al.
6.3. Testing on Adversarial Samples
We then evaluated the detectors chosen in the previous
section on the co-occurrence adversarial examples, with re-
sults shown in Table 3. For both detectors, the gray-box
co-occurrence attack drops the GAN detection rate from ap-
proximately 98% to less than 4%, with no knowledge of the
deep-learning model used. As expected with the PGD at-
tack, accuracy on the exact model being attacked drops to 0.
However, accuracy on MobileNet drops to only 8%; more
than twice what was achieved with the gray-box attack.
6.4. Adversarial Training
Next we adversarially trained the same networks using
different subsets of the adversarial samples. The labels re-
main binary, with real images in one class, and all GAN
images, including adversarial GAN images, in the other.
For data balancing, we maintain an equal number of
positive and negative samples. Within the positive sample
class, each of the sub-types is sampled equally. For exam-
ple, in the test using all gray-box co-occurrence adversarial
Test
Real GAN CO λ = 0 CO PGD
Train Real, GAN 0.979 0.984 0.030 0.000Real, GAN, All Adv 0.901 0.971 0.970 1.000
Table 4. Results for only the ResNet18 co-occurrence detector.
The rows show results with and without adversarial retraining.
examples, we used 16 real, 4 GAN, and 4 from each of the
3 gray-box co-occurrence classes. For the set of all adver-
sarial images, a batch size of 40 is used so the batch can be
evenly divided. For all other cases, batch size remains 32.
6.4.1 Full Results
All results are shown in table 5, with a summary of just
the co-occurrence results in table 4. These results show test
accuracy on only one group at a time. When comparing
across rows, it is important to note any changes in accuracy
on real images in addition to changes in GAN performance.
From this table, we summarize the results as follows:
1. Without adversarial retraining, all adversarial attacks
would generally decrease performance on all detectors.
2. Adversarially training on one attack method does not
generally improve performance against other methods.
3. After adversarial training, the models which are most
different from the assumption in the adversarial attacks
performed best. Notably, MobileNet trained on all ad-
versarial images got over 98% on all subsets.
Of particular relevance to this paper is that for all co-
occurrence based detectors which were not trained on the
gray-box co-occurrence based attack, accuracy was less
than 5% for λ = 0. This included models which were
trained on all other adversarial attacks. This would seem
to indicate that most co-occurrence detectors not trained on
this particular attack would remain highly vulnerable. After
retraining, accuracy on the λ = 0 class was only slightly
lower than regular GAN class. The difference was more
significant in the MobileNet co-occurrence detector.
Also noteworthy is that the DFT and direct classifiers
performed, on average, 18% worse on the GB-CO λ = 0
set than the original GAN images, if they were not trained
against the GB-CO attack. Performance generally improved
back to baseline levels after retraining.
6.5. Other Tests
6.5.1 Reversed Gray-Box Co-Occurrence Attack
Though less useful as a real-world attack, the GB-CO
method can also be used to generate real images which will
be classified as GAN. With the target and source switched,
we produced a test set of adversarial real images, and tested
on the regular ResNet18 co-occurrence detector (row 1 in
table 5). 95.9% of the images were misclassified as GAN.
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Real GAN Co-Occur Gray-Box DFT Gray-Box PGD
λ = 0.0 λ = 3.0 λ = 10.0 λ = 0.003 λ = 0.01 λ = 0.03 Co-Occur DFT Direct
ResNet18
Co-Occur
No Adv* 0.979 0.984 0.030 0.019 0.332 0.624 0.627 0.627 0.000 0.863 0.854
No Adv 0.976 0.980 0.032 0.027 0.358 0.906 0.883 0.852 0.000 0.907 0.878
GBCO 0.0 0.972 0.966 0.957 0.992 0.932 0.473 0.480 0.476 0.144 0.822 0.794
GB-CO 3.0 0.974 0.972 0.424 0.985 0.999 0.702 0.685 0.666 0.311 0.923 0.910
GB-CO 10.0 0.985 0.973 0.121 0.826 0.997 0.360 0.402 0.444 0.000 0.890 0.876
All GB-CO 0.964 0.951 0.947 0.999 0.997 0.415 0.448 0.472 0.104 0.883 0.858
All GB-DFT 0.968 0.984 0.047 0.029 0.222 0.998 0.997 0.994 0.000 0.893 0.880
All PGD 0.974 0.974 0.031 0.045 0.449 0.832 0.783 0.713 1.000 0.996 0.995
All Adv 0.901 0.971 0.970 0.999 0.999 0.993 0.987 0.969 1.000 0.981 0.984
DFT
No Adv* 0.874 0.934 0.824 0.796 0.860 0.311 0.277 0.239 0.853 0.284 0.888
No Adv 0.882 0.971 0.801 0.808 0.914 0.235 0.236 0.218 0.971 0.165 0.910
All GB-CO 0.868 0.973 0.962 0.967 0.965 0.213 0.200 0.214 0.964 0.420 0.831
All GB-DFT 0.905 0.831 0.851 0.820 0.881 0.950 0.946 0.913 0.925 0.273 0.780
All PGD 0.959 0.930 0.809 0.784 0.875 0.114 0.089 0.089 0.943 0.992 0.935
All Adv 0.771 0.834 0.983 0.984 0.984 0.890 0.962 0.956 0.951 0.858 0.870
Direct
No Adv* 0.974 0.985 0.782 0.792 0.932 0.286 0.355 0.384 0.989 0.989 0.000
No Adv 0.947 0.989 0.868 0.862 0.965 0.279 0.369 0.427 0.992 0.991 0.013
All GB-CO 0.971 0.966 0.995 0.995 0.994 0.290 0.428 0.524 0.976 0.975 0.032
All GB-DFT 0.930 0.964 0.774 0.783 0.896 0.998 0.999 0.998 0.959 0.960 0.090
All PGD 0.979 0.976 0.849 0.848 0.963 0.193 0.287 0.363 0.991 0.988 0.997
All Adv 0.936 0.981 0.993 0.993 0.994 0.996 0.999 0.999 0.989 0.988 0.999
MobileNet
Co-Occur
No Adv* 0.976 0.981 0.039 0.027 0.456 0.576 0.556 0.553 0.083 0.945 0.914
No Adv 0.974 0.985 0.029 0.020 0.359 0.695 0.672 0.647 0.036 0.947 0.924
All Adv 0.952 0.974 0.955 0.999 0.999 0.996 0.994 0.986 1.000 0.996 0.995
DFT
No Adv* 0.955 0.962 0.632 0.630 0.748 0.182 0.187 0.190 0.941 0.222 0.891
No Adv 0.928 0.970 0.524 0.539 0.770 0.192 0.189 0.176 0.926 0.217 0.910
All Adv 0.865 0.911 0.981 0.982 0.985 0.956 0.959 0.919 0.983 0.926 0.944
Direct
No Adv* 0.995 0.997 0.553 0.635 0.845 0.204 0.189 0.190 0.979 0.984 0.787
No Adv 0.993 0.996 0.640 0.694 0.808 0.088 0.043 0.030 0.849 0.861 0.744
All Adv 0.989 0.984 0.993 0.996 0.999 0.999 1.000 0.999 0.997 0.998 0.998
Table 5. Comprehensive table showing test set results on all datasets, for many training combinations. Each row represents a different
detector and/or training set, and each column the data set tested on. The PGD data is generated using the models labeled with an asterisk.
6.5.2 Cross Channel Co-Occurrence Detector
Recenty a paper was posted on arXiv from M. Barni et al.
claiming to have improved the original co-occurrence GAN
detector by including cross-channel co-occurrence matri-
ces [1]. Their cross-band co-occurrence matrices for a red-
green pair are defined in equation 13, assuming HWC con-
vention on X . This is repeated for the red-blue and green-
blue pairs. For spatial co-occurrence, they instead use di-
agonal pairs, shown in equation 14. After producing these
6 co-occurrence matrices, they are stacked in the channel
dimension, and passed to a ResNet18 classifier.
Ci,j =
∑
k,l
δ(Xk,l,1 − i) · δ(Xk,l,2 − j) (13)
Ci,j =
∑
k,l
δ(Xk,l − i) · δ(Xk+1,l+1 − j) (14)
We also modified the co-occurrence gray-box attack
equation in 6 to accept the 6 different pairs used in M. Barni
et al. We ran the algorithm to produce an adversarial test
set for the cross-band co-occurrence detector. Results are
shown in table 6. The gray-box attack still seems effective
against detectors using this other co-occurrence feature.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we presented two new attacks against co-
occurrence based GAN detectors. We also demonstrate pre-
Real GAN Adv C-Band
0.974 0.992 0.131
Table 6. Results of cross-channel co-occurrence detector on cross-
channel co-occurrence method described in section 6.5.2, without
adversarial retraining. Adversarial images were generated using
the gray-box method, using this new co-occurrence formulation.
liminary results showing that our attack can also general-
ize to at least one novel modification of our original co-
occurrence function. Our work demonstrates the current
vulnerability of three of the most popular detection meth-
ods to our adversarial attack, indicating the need for a real-
world detector to be trained with these adversarial exam-
ples.
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